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The	Impact	of	Corruption	on	Analyst	Coverage	
Abstract	
Purpose: This study investigates the impact of country-level corruption and firms’ anti-
bribery policies on analyst coverage. Analyst coverage has been identified as a powerful tool 
to detect fraud and should equally act as a possible tool to reduce corruption. 
Design/methodology/approach: It employs a negative binomial count regression 
method on a longitudinal dataset of a sample of S&P Global 1200 companies for the years 2010 
to 2015. To control for potential endogeneity bias and improve the reliability of the estimation, 
both country-level corruption and firms’ anti-bribery policies variables were instrumented. 
Findings: After controlling for potential endogeneity bias, the results show that the adoption 
of anti-bribery policies at firm level attract more analysts to follow a firm. The results for 
corruption at country level show that analyst coverage increases in less corrupted countries 
indicating that the costs of corruption exceed its potential benefits. When the variables 
corruption at country level and anti-bribery policies are interacted, the relationship is positive 
and highly significant.  
Practical implications: Given the potential important role played by anti-corruption 
measures, firms are encouraged to adopt them to reduce the incidence of corruption and to 
increase analyst coverage which will reinforce the benign effect of monitoring.  
Originality/value: Although the literature on corruption at the country level is rich, it is 
geared towards the determinants of corruption in contrast to its consequences, and fewer studies 
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have focused on the impact of corruption at firm level due to data limitations. This paper 
addresses this gap and contributes to the literature on the consequences of corruption at firm 
level. 
Keywords: analyst coverage; analysts following; sell-side analysts; corruption; anti-bribery 
policies, multi-country, S&P Global 1200. 
JEL:  G12; G14; M4; G230; G240; M490; D73 
Type:  Research Paper 
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1.	Introduction		
This study contributes to the growing literature on the impact of corruption. Judge et al. (2011) 
observe that the literature on corruption has been skewed towards examining the causes of 
corruption in contrast to its consequences as they observe that the number of papers published 
on the causes is twice as large as the number of papers published on the consequences of 
corruption. This paper reduces this gap in the literature by empirically examining the impact 
of corruption on analyst coverage. It investigates the impact of country-level corruption and 
firms’ anti-bribery policies on analyst coverage. Corruption at firm level can impact analyst 
coverage due to increased costs of information acquisition and costs associated with the 
revelation of corruption (Dyck et al., 2010). If a firm adopts anti-bribery policies, this may 
provide some assurance to analysts that the management is proactive in dealing with corruption 
at firm level. Corruption at country level can impact analyst coverage through increased levels 
of information costs, thereby reducing the number of analysts following. Alternatively, high 
levels of corruption at country level may induce the demand for analyst service for monitoring 
purposes, increasing thereby analyst coverage. Thus, the association between country-level 
corruption and analyst coverage depends on a trade-off between the costs and benefits 
associated with analyst coverage. The importance of analyst coverage is identified by Dyck et 
al. (2010) in table 2 page 2225, in the context of corporate fraud, as the second most effective 
fraud detectors within external governance, well ahead of other groups such as auditors and 
industry regulators. Therefore, it is important to examine the determinants of analyst coverage, 
related to the actions taken by companies to tackle corruption. To do so, this paper uses a novel 
panel dataset of a sample of S&P Global 1200 companies for the years 2010 to 2015. This 
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index represents 70% of global market capitalization, which provides good coverage and 
international reach as well as enhancing the generalizability of the results. 
There are many definitions of corruption (e.g., Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Jain, 2001; Svensson 
2003). Cuervo-Cazurra (2016, p. 36) defines corruption as the “abuse of entrusted power for 
private gains”. Entrusted power could originate from the government, shareholders, employees, 
trustees. Therefore, the abuse of entrusted power goes beyond the government and includes 
firms, international organisations, not-for-profit organisations and non-governmental 
organisations.  Also, this definition indicates that people abuse that entrusted power for their 
own benefits at the cost of their organizations (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). Whether it is explicit 
in the form of bribes or implicit in the form of commission, corruption is perceived as a social 
evil and unethical practice that increases the hidden and real costs of doing business and can 
result in misallocation of resources (Alam, 1995; Kehoe, 1998; Dal Bó and Rossi; 2007; Chen 
et al., 2010). Corruption creates barriers to foreign direct investment, dislocates international 
trade and misleads public policy (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Zhao et al., 2003). However, the 
consequences of corruption on the economic performance of firms is less clear (Jong and Ees, 
2014; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016) with a few studies (e.g., Wu, 2005; Chen et al., 2010) indicating 
that corruption increases the information asymmetry between the management and outside 
providers of funds, increasing thereby information costs. 
On the other hand, following Bhushan's (1989) seminal paper, prior studies have investigated 
different determinants of analyst coverage at both firm and country levels including firm 
characteristics, corporate governance issues, levels of investor protection, cross-listing, 
dynamics of coverage, the quality of accounting standards and listing location (e.g., Bushman 
et al., 2004; Boubakri and Bouslimi, 2010; Yu, 2010; Chen et al., 2007; Giraldo, 2011; Abed 
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et al.,  2012; Kim and Shi, 2012, Hassan and Skinner, 2016). However, to date, there is a lack 
of direct empirical evidence on the association between analyst coverage and corruption, 
although corruption is perceived as a deterioration factor to the information environment and 
the economic performance of companies (e.g., Wu, 2005; Dal Bó and Rossi, 2007; Doh et al., 
2003; Rodriguez et al., 2006; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). In addition, although the literature on 
corruption is growing, it is mostly skewed towards examining the causes of corruption rather 
than its consequences (Judge et al., 2011). In this context, this study contributes to the literature 
in several aspects. It contributes to the literature on corruption by investigating the 
consequences of corruption at firm level. It also contributes to the literature on analyst coverage 
by extending the determinants of analysts following beyond firm characteristics to include firm 
policy and institutional factors. It postulates that the association between country-level 
corruption and analyst coverage depends on a trade-off between the benefits and costs 
associated with analyst coverage. In addition, while self-reported anti-bribery policies might 
not be enough to draw on their effectiveness in combating bribery and corruption at the firm 
level, it postulates that such policies may signal the serious commitment of the management to 
prevent, monitor and address corruption. It extends the work of Hassan and Giorgioni (2015) 
by utilising a more recent, longitudinal dataset in contrast to their cross-sectional analysis and 
controlling for potential endogeneity bias. In addition, the results of Hassan and Giorgioni 
(2015) are likely to suffer from selection bias because they limit their sample to companies 
with analyst coverage only, whereas companies that do not attract analyst coverage are 
excluded from their sample. In contrast, the current study performs a two-stage regression 
analysis utilising a panel dataset of a sample of S&P Global 1200 companies for the years 2010 
to 2015 to control for potential endogeneity bias in the estimation of the research model. In this 
dataset, the number of analysts following a company ranges from 0 to 63. The use of panel data 
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analysis provides many advantages over both the traditional cross-sectional and time-series 
analyses. It provides the researcher with a larger number of observations, increasing the degrees 
of freedom for any statistical testing and lessening the problem of multicollinearity among the 
explanatory variables (Hsiao, 2002), improving thereby the efficiency of estimates. In addition, 
prior studies on analyst coverage tend to apply variations of the classical linear regression 
model to datasets where the dependent variable (the number of analysts following) can only 
take non-negative integer values. In contrast, this study employs an econometric procedure that 
adjusts for the count nature of the dependent variable, as employed by Rock et al. (2001), 
Boubaker and Labégorre (2008) and Hassan and Skinner (2016), except that we apply the count 
data regression technique on a larger and more recent multi-country sample. Specifically, we 
employ a negative binomial count regression method to a sample of 5888 firm-year 
observations from 30 different countries. The current study also employs the Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as a proxy for corruption score at country 
level, which is typically used in prior studies (e.g., Yu, 2010; Chen et al., 2010, Judge et al., 
2011). This index captures the perceptions of business people, academics, and risk analysts of 
the level of corruption at the country level.  The CPI ranks countries based on how corrupt their 
public sector is perceived to be on a scale of 0 - 100, where 0 means that a country is perceived 
as highly corrupt and 100 means it is perceived as very clean. The CPI has been validated as a 
proxy for corruption at country level in prior studies (e.g., Wilhelm, 2002; Davis and Ruhe, 
2003). After controlling for potential endogeneity bias in the variables of interest, the results 
show that the adoption of anti-bribery policies at firm level attract more analysts to follow a 
firm, in line with our hypothesis. The results for corruption at country level show that analyst 
coverage increases in less corrupted countries indicating that the costs of corruption exceed its 
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benefits. When the variables corruption at country level and anti-bribery policies are interacted, 
the relationship is positive and highly significant.  
The importance of the current study arises from the importance of analyst coverage to firm 
visibility. According to Arbel et al. (1983) and Merton (1987) neglected or less-visible firms 
are ones that are not followed by large numbers of financial analysts (investors) on a regular 
basis. Financial analysts increase the visibility of the firms they follow by signalling 
information about their performance, increasing thereby the demand for their common shares 
even when they do not actively add new information about these firms (Mola et al., 2013; Li 
and You, 2015).  Also, higher analyst coverage may lead to the company being included either 
in industry reports or as an industry comparison in a report on a larger company, creating both 
visibility and credibility (Bushee and Miller, 2012). In addition, prior empirical studies  suggest 
that higher1 analyst coverage is associated with lower transaction costs, higher stock liquidity, 
lower cost of capital and lower audit fees (e.g., Doukas et al., 2000; Jung et al., 2012; Lang et 
al., 2012; Easley and O'hara, 2004; Gotti et al., 2012). Therefore, it is not surprising that analyst 
coverage is actively pursued by firms. For example, Anantharaman and Zhang (2011) provide 
evidence that managers value analyst coverage and are willing to expend resources to maintain 
a particular level of that coverage. Also, Cliff and Denis (2004) find that firms are willing to 
                                                 
1 However, analyst coverage may also have some negative effects on firm performance. For instance, He and 
Tian (2013) show that firms covered by a larger number of analysts generate fewer patents or patents with lower 
impact.  The  reason  is  that  innovation  involves  a  lengthy  process  that  is  full  of uncertainty  and  has  a  high 
probability  of  failure,  making  the  firm  more  vulnerable  to,  for  example,  hostile  takeovers.  As  a  reaction, 
managers  tend  to  invest  less  in  innovation  and prioritise  routine  tasks  that offer quicker and more  certain 
returns, possibly sacrificing the long‐term success of the firm. 
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compensate for analyst coverage through initial public offerings premiums. Bushee and Miller 
(2012) note that some firms may resort to hiring investor relations professionals to pitch their 
business to analysts, and Kirk (2011) states that firms are prepared to buy paid-for research. 
Sibilkov et al. (2013) find that firms value analyst coverage and are prepared to strategically 
use the choice of appointments for mergers and acquisitions advisors to secure analyst 
coverage. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of 
the literature and develops the research hypotheses. Section 3 explains the research model. 
Section 4 describes the research samples and discusses the results. Section 5 provides 
concluding remarks. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development	
Financial analysts collect a wide variety of information about the firms they follow, their 
industries and markets, analyze it and produce their reports. These reports may include buy, 
sell or hold recommendations, the competitive position of the firm relative to its rivals and 
analysts’ forecasts of earnings and cash flows. According to the seminal paper of Bhushan’s 
(1989), the equilibrium total expenditure by investors on analyst services for a particular firm 
in a given period is a function of the aggregate demand for and supply of analyst services.  
Demand for analyst services arises in situations characterised by information asymmetry where 
agency problems can arise between managers and outside providers of funds. Analyst coverage 
helps mitigate these problems by providing information about the quality of investment 
opportunities to outside providers of funds and to the financial intermediaries they represent 
(Palepu et al., 2013). This information intermediary role of analysts goes beyond interpreting 
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corporate disclosure to discovering new information and clarifying and confirming corporate 
disclosures (Huang et al., 2017). Chen et al. (2015) show how analysts help reducing the agency 
problem between shareholders and managers through direct and indirect monitoring. Analysts 
can provide a direct monitoring role through regular examination of the financial statements of 
the firms they follow and frequent interactions with the management via conference calls for 
example. They can also provide an indirect monitoring role through the dissemination of 
information to institutional investors and ordinary investors through research reports and media 
outlets such as newspapers and TV programs. Therefore, we expect that in a highly corrupt 
country, the monitoring role of analysts will be even more important, driving thereby the 
demand for analyst services and increasing analyst coverage. Alternatively, analysts 
themselves might be bribed to provide coverage (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). 
However, higher level of corruption can also reduce analyst coverage due to increased level of 
information costs. According to Bhushan’s (1989) model, the aggregate supply of outside 
analyst service is a function of the information costs they incur. The higher the information 
costs associated with following a specific company, the less likely that analysts will follow that 
company.  
 If country-level corruption is high, it is more likely that bribes and corruption will be perceived 
as normal ways of doing business even if this is illegal (Hauser and Hogenacker, 2014). 
According to transaction cost economics theory (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016), operating in a corrupt 
country increases transaction costs because firms incur the costs of bribes to do business, in 
addition to the time and attention devoted by its employees to manage corrupt activates. 
However, bribes can also facilitate business activities and increase firms’ revenues. In addition, 
operating in a corrupt country increases uncertainty because managers are not sure whether 
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they are bribing the right people, and whether they will receive the promised benefits of these 
bribes. Thus, the net impact of corruption on firms’ profitability depends on a trade-off between 
the costs and benefits associated with bribes. This, in turn, increases the level of uncertainty 
that analysts face in projecting future earnings and cash flows for these firms (Chen et al., 
2010). In addition, managers who are engaged in corrupt practices will try to hide the bribe 
payments (Wu, 2005), increasing thereby the level of information asymmetry between the 
management and outside providers of funds and market participants in general. This, in turn, 
makes it even harder for analysts to collect and process relevant information about the firms 
they follow to produce their reports. Moreover, high level of corruption may induce access to 
private information through bribes, reducing thereby the demand for outside analyst services.  
Furthermore, Dal Bó and Rossi (2007) find that more corruption at the country level is strongly 
associated with more inefficient firms, in the sense that they employ more inputs to produce a 
given level of output. This, in turn, means that analysts will have to restate the financial 
statements to eliminate the effect of corruption, increasing thereby the costs of collecting and 
processing information. Following companies operating in highly corrupt countries can also 
increase the likelihood of financial loss for outside analysts if, for instance, they fail to provide 
an effective monitoring tool for stakeholders (Dyck et al., 2010). Karpoff et al. (2008) note that 
the largest monetary penalties inflicted to companies caught in corruption cases are not 
imposed by regulators or courts, but are imposed by the market, where presumably analyst 
coverage does play an important role.  Karpoff et al. (2008) estimate that a quarter of the loss 
in market value is due to a re-assessment of the true financial situation of a firm (i.e. without 
the advantages obtained through corruption), but two-third are due to the loss of reputation as 
stakeholders of the company (e.g., investors, customers, and suppliers) modify the way they 
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conduct business with the company. Legal costs only play a minor role (around 10%) of the 
overall loss of stock market value.   
Thus, the association between country-level corruption and analyst coverage depends on a 
trade-off between the costs and benefits associated with analyst coverage. If the benefits of the 
monitoring role of analysts in highly corrupt countries are higher (lower) than their associated 
costs, higher level of corruption will be associated with higher (lower) analyst coverage. 
Therefore, we develop our first hypothesis without estimating a direction of such association 
as a priori:  
H1: there is an association between the level of corruption and the number of analysts 
following  
Recent years have witnessed an international shift towards strengthening anti-corruption laws 
in many countries worldwide such as the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the UK Bribery 
Act, the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, the Canadian Corruption 
of Foreign Public Officials Act, among others. One aspect of these strengths is to criminally 
prosecute corruption practice by individuals and companies in their home countries even when 
the corrupt practice occurs abroad (Hauser and Hogenacker, 2014; Carr-Howard, 2014; 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). Failure to adhere to such laws can result in serious reputational 
damage, significant fines, imprisonment of individuals, and debarment of organizations from 
conducting business with national and local governments (Carr-Howard, 2014). According to 
the neo-institutional theory, companies are motivated to address the norms, rules, and 
12 
 
regulations that prevail in their respective external institutional environments2 to earn the 
legitimacy needed to operate in their societies (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016).  
In this context, firms can take a wide range of internal measures to tackle corruption and 
preserve its legitimacy. These measures are called firm-level controls of corruption and 
include, but not limited to, financial record keeping, statements by executive officers, internal 
monitoring, whistle-blowing facilities, use of compliance manuals, appointment of compliance 
officers or committees, threats of disciplinary actions and training for compliance, among 
others (Gordon and Miyake, 2001). Cuervo-Cazurra (2016) suggests future research to study 
the effectiveness of firm-level controls of corruption in reducing bribery by their managers. 
Adam and Rachman-Moore (2004) find that the social norms of the organization are perceived 
by employees to have the most influence on their conduct. Hauser and Hogenacker (2014) 
find that firms tend to follow a reactive approach toward the management of corruption risks 
in foreign countries and only implement anti-corruption measures if they have been confronted 
with the issue. Dyck et al. (2010) demonstrate that the incentives for the existing network of 
whistleblowers (auditors, analysts, and employees) are weak, thus it may be easier for the 
analyst just to drop coverage of companies involved in corrupt activities rather than revising 
their recommendations and developing a reputation of exposing corporate scandals (Young and 
Peng, 2013). While self-reported anti-bribery policies might not be enough to draw on their 
                                                 
2 This gives  rise  to a potential ethical dilemma  if  the perceived norms,  rules and  regulations  in dealing with 
corruption are different between the home and host countries. An example is a multinational business that has 
a headquarter in a highly clean country, but its subsidiaries operate in corrupt countries where the social norms 
about  corruption  could be very different. Although  this  is an  interesting area  for  research,  the  focus  in  the 
current study is the anti‐corruption policies that companies adopt in their respective home countries and their 
impact on analyst coverage. 
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effectiveness in combating bribery and corruption at the firm level, the fact that a firm adopts 
and reports such policies may signal the serious commitment of the management to prevent, 
monitor and address corruption (Transparency International, 2009).  In fact, recent empirical 
evidence shows that self-reported anti-corruption policies do reflect companies’ real efforts to 
combat bribery and corruption and not merely cheap talk (Healy and Serafeim, 2013). 
Therefore, it is expected that firms that have signed such measures will have larger analyst 
coverage, hence the second research hypothesis is: 
H2: the adoption of anti-bribery policies at firm level is expected to induce the number of 
analysts following a company 
Another issue that worth investigating is whether the adoption of anti-bribery policies in firms 
that operate in highly corrupt countries would mitigate the impact of country-level corruption 
and induce analyst coverage. In other words, we examine the impact of the interaction term 
between corruption at country level and firms’ self-reported anti-corruption policies on analyst 
coverage. Therefore, the third research hypothesis is: 
H3: the presence of anti-bribery policies at firm level increases the number of analysts 
following a company that operates in a highly corrupt country. 
3.	Research	model		
Bhushan (1989) considers various company characteristics that impact the number of analysts 
following a firm such as ownership structure, firm size, and return variability. Following 
Bhushan (1989), the current study examines the impact of country-level corruption and firms’ 
anti-bribery policies on analyst coverage, controlling for several firm-level and country-level 
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factors. Therefore, the research model takes the following form  (cross-section and time 
identifiers are suppressed for simplicity): 
ܱܰܣ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣܤܲ ൅ ߚଶ	ܥܲܫ ൅ ߚଷ	ሺܣܤܲ ∗ ܥܲܫሻ ൅ ߚସ	ܰܫܰܵܶ ൅ ߚହ	ܫܰܵܶ ൅ ߚ଺	ܫܰܵܫܦ
൅ ߚ଻	ܯܥܣܲ ൅ ߚ଼ܸܱܮ ൅ ߚଽ	ܵܧܩ ൅ ߚଵ଴	ܤܧܶܣ ൅ ߚଵଵܴܱܣ ൅ ߚଵଶܩܣܣܲ
൅ ߚଵଷܫܰܦܷܴܻܵܶ ൅ ߚଵସܥܩܱܸ ൅ ߚଵହܩܦܲ ൅ ߝ 
However, it could be argued that analyst coverage could itself induce firms to change their 
behaviour. For instance, firms may be more inclined to adopt anti-bribery policies as a 
consequence of analyst coverage. Therefore, the variables ABP and NOA may be 
endogenously determined. Endogeneity may lead to biased results. Therefore, this paper 
employs a two-stage regression analysis to remove the problem of endogeneity between the 
adoption of anti-bribery measures (ABP) and analyst coverage. The instrumental variables are 
HRP and BEP (please see table 1 for more details). This study uses a popular measure for 
corruption at the country level, i.e. the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI), which is typically used in prior studies (e.g., Yu, 2010; Chen et al., 2010) and  has 
been validated against other alternative proxies of corruption in prior studies (e.g., Wilhelm, 
2002; Davis and Ruhe, 2003). This index captures the perceptions of business people, 
academics, and risk analysts of the level of corruption at country level. However, some issues 
have been raised in the literature concerning the use of perception indexes in general (e.g., 
Olken, 2009; Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2010) and the CPI in particular (e.g., Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2001; Knack, 2007; Donchev and Ujhelyi, 2014). For example, the surveys 
document “expert opinions” of a small number of respondents (or perceptions of what “other 
firms” are doing) rather than their actual experience of corruption. Respondents may also be 
influenced by previous ratings or by recent events positive (recent economic performance) or 
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negative (recent publicized corruption scandals). In addition, Donchev and Ujhelyi (2014) 
claim that economic development, political system, and cultural variables tend to bias 
perceptions of corruption away from experience. Furthermore, Fan et al. (2009) report that 
countries with similar levels of corruption frequency (gleaned from surveys) may have very 
different levels of corruption perceptions and vice versa.  Moreover, the methodology for 
measuring the index has been changed in 2012, forcing a reduction in the number of 
observations that could be used. Therefore, we have re-estimated CPI with instrumental 
variables (FDI is the percentage of foreign direct investment net inflow to GDP and Openness 
is the imports of goods and services (% of GDP)). This procedure could also allay the fear that 
the variable CPI (perception of corruption) on aggregate, may itself be influenced by the level 
of corruption of firms, which in itself could be influenced by analyst coverage. Variable 
definition and measurement are explained in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 about here  
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: 
NOA: The total number of analysts making recommendations for the security at the financial 
year-end. 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES:  
ABP: A dummy variable to represent firms’ self-reported anti-corruption policies. It takes the 
value of one if the company has policies in place to prevent corruption and zero otherwise. 
CPI: The corruption score at the country level provided by Transparency International, which 
is typically used in prior studies, see Judge et al. (2011) for a review of papers that have used 
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this measure. It reflects the perceived level of corruption at the country level, which aggregates 
information from multiple surveys into one indicator for the country (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016, 
p. 38). It takes a value from 0 to 100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly 
corrupt and 100 means it is perceived as very clean.  
FIRM-LEVEL CONTROL VARIABLES:  
Several firm-level controls are considered in the research model, namely: ownership structure 
(NINST; INST; INSID), firm size (MCAP), business complexity (SEG), return volatility 
(VOL; BETA), firm profitability (ROA), the quality of the accounting standards (GAAP) and 
industry-type (INDUSTRY). Where, NINST is the number of institutions holding shares in a 
company, and INST (INSID) is the percentage of institutional (insiders’) holding in a company. 
According to Bhushan (1989) more concentrated institutional ownership (NINST; INST) may 
increase (decrease) the demand on in-house analyst services rather than outside analyst services 
if this is cost effective (ineffective) for individual institutional investors. In addition, a negative 
association between INSID and NOA is expected because insiders would have access to private 
information, reducing thereby the demand on outside analyst services (Bhushan, 1989). 
Firm size (MCAP) is the market value of equity. SEG is the number of recorded business 
segments. Larger firms (MCAP) are expected to attract higher analyst coverage because they 
are widely held, have wider investors’ bases with more potential transactions business to 
outside analysts. However, as the number of business segments (SEG) increases, the number 
of analysts following will decrease as the firm will become more complex and expensive to 
follow (Bhushan, 1989). 
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VOL is the standard deviation of the relative price change for the 360 calendar days closing 
price, expressed as a percentage, while BETA is the market model beta for each stock measured 
via the market model using weekly data. Higher return volatility (VOL; BETA) implies higher 
uncertainty in predicting future returns. Thus, if outside analyst information is perceived to add 
valuable information over and above public information in predicting future returns, then 
higher return volatility is expected to increase the demand for outside analyst services (e.g., 
Bhushan, 1989; Hussain, 2000; Boubaker and Labégorre, 2008).  
ROA is the return on assets to proxy for firm profitability. Prior empirical studies suggest that 
analysts will be reluctant to follow less profitable companies (e.g., Boubaker and Labégorre, 
2008), implying a positive association between ROA and NOA. Furthermore, we include a 
dummy variable (GAAP), takes the value of 1 if the country applies US accounting standards 
or international financial reporting standards (IFRS) and 0 otherwise, to proxy for the quality 
of the accounting standards applied by the sample firms, where high-quality accounting 
standards are expected to attract more analyst coverage (e.g., Kim and Shi, 2012). In addition, 
the quality of the accounting standards might also be associated with the extent of the perceived 
corruption at country level since Khalil et al. (2015) find that firms are less likely to grant gift 
to secure a government contract in countries having more extensive financial reporting 
requirements. Also, we include industry dummies (INDUSTRY) that takes the value of 1 for 
the relevant industry and 0 otherwise to control for the type of industry. 
COUNTRY-LEVEL CONTROL VARIABLES: 
CGOV is the governance index at country level, which is developed using the principal 
component analysis. It is the first principal component of all corporate governance indicators 
at country level except the control of corruption indicator. It explains 75% of the variation in 
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the corporate governance indicators. It is expected that better corporate governance 
environment will attract more analyst coverage. Alternatively, in a bad corporate governance 
environment, there is more demand for the monitoring role of outside analysts. GDP is the 
gross domestic product per capita to measure country income. 
4.	Sample	and	Results	
4.1	Research	sample		
This study examines the impact of corruption on analyst coverage utilising a sample of S&P 
Global 1200 companies from 2010 to 2015. The S&P Global 1200 index represents 70% of 
global market capitalization, which is likely to offer good variation in the variables of interest 
and has international reach. The S&P Global 1200 consists of 7 indices, many of which are 
accepted leaders in their regions. These include the S&P 500 (US), S&P Europe 350, S&P 
TOPIX 150 (Japan), S&P/TSX 60 (Canada), S&P/ASX All Australian 50, S&P Asia 50 and 
S&P Latin America 40. According to the OECD (2014), most international bribes are paid by 
large companies to win contracts in advance economies rather than in the developing world, 
and that most bribe payers and takers are from wealthy countries, which justifies the choice of 
our sample and setting.  
We collected data for the constituents of S&P Global 1200 for the years 2010 to 2015 
deliberately avoiding the recent financial crisis of 2008/09. Data at the firm level are collected 
from Bloomberg database. Data on the Corruption Perception Index scores (CPI) are obtained 
from Transparency International database. Data on gross domestic product per capita, foreign 
direct investments, corporate governance indicators, and imports of goods and services to GDP 
are obtained from the World Bank. This has yielded an initial sample of 1187 companies for 
the years 2010 to 2015 with 7122 firm-year observations. However, the final sample size 
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depends on data availability for each variable included in the model. It is worth noting that 
Transparent International has changed its methodology in calculating corruption score in 2012. 
The final common sample consists of 1050 firms covering 30 different countries for the years 
2010 to 2015 with 5888 firm-year observations. Table 2 shows a breakdown of the sample by 
country. Interestingly, countries like South Africa and China that are at the lower end of the 
GDP and CPI spectrums attract higher than average analyst coverage. This table also tells an 
interesting story about the average of analyst coverage, corruption and GDP, which goes 
against intuition or common sense. For example, a country like China has an average GDP per 
capita of 5,533 USD with corruption score (CPI) of 24 but attracts higher than average analyst 
coverage (29), whereas a country like Australia has an average GDP per capita of 53,363 USD 
with a corruption score of 81 but attracts less than average analyst coverage of 15. Another 
example, countries like South Africa and Austria, and Brazil and Chili have the same average 
number of analyst following but they have significantly different levels of corruption. A third 
example is that it is not the US but South Korea that attracts the highest average number of 
analyst coverage. Thus, the perception that highly clean countries would attract more analyst 
coverage is not observed from these figures which highlights that the association between 
analyst coverage and the extent of corruption is an empirical issue. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
4.2	Results	and	Discussion	
Table 3 Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of all the variables. It shows that the average 
company in the research sample comes from a moderately clean country with a CPI score of 
74 and an average GDP of 46,851 USD.  It also shows that 62% of the sample firms have 
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policies in place to tackle corruption at the firm level. The ownership structure of a typical firm 
in the sample is 66% institutional holding (INST) and less than 2% insiders holding (INSID). 
The average number of analysts following a firm (NOA) is about 22 with an average number 
of 633 institutions holdings (NINST). Market capitalization (MCAP) for a typical firm is on 
average 28,361 million USD.  Average return variability (VOL) is 31 and market beta (BETA) 
is 1 on average. A typical firm has 4 segments (SEG) on average and an average return on 
assets (ROA) of 5%. About 89% of the sample firms apply either US accounting standards or 
IFRS.  
Panel B of Table 3 shows the pair-wise correlation matrix. The correlations do not identify any 
need for concerns about multicollinearity since most correlations are quite weak. The results 
show no correlation between NOA and CPI in contrast to hypothesis no 1. However, they show 
that the higher the probability that a firm adopts an anti-bribery policy (ABP), the higher the 
number of analysts following it, consistent with hypothesis no 2. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Table 3 also shows that the number of analysts following (NOA) is positively associated with 
the number of institutions holding shares in a company (NINST), firm size (MCAP), firm 
profitability (ROA), and the quality of accounting standards (GAAP) consistent with results 
from prior studies (e.g., Bhushan, 1989; Hussain, 2000; Boubaker and Labégorre, 2008; Kim 
and Shi, 2012). The association between the number of analysts following and the number of 
recorded segments (SEG) is positive and significant, contrary to expectations, indicating higher 
analyst coverage for more complex companies. Table 3 also shows a negative and significant 
correlation between NOA and the percentage of institutional holdings (INST) indicating that 
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higher percentage of institutional holdings motivates more reliance on the service of in-house 
analysts rather than outside analysts (Bhushan, 1989). Furthermore, Table 3 also shows a 
negative and significant association between analyst coverage and return volatility (VOL) 
inconsistent with prior expectations. However, these findings reflect pair-wise correlations 
only, a multi-regression analysis could yield different results. 
Table 4 reports the results for the research model explaining analyst coverage. The estimation 
is based on a count regression model that better suits an integer dependent variable, after 
controlling for heteroscedasticity.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) assumes that the dependent variable is continuous where clearly 
our dependent variable, i.e. NOA, is a count integer taking on values from 0 to 63. Using OLS 
in this context can lead to biased and inconsistent estimates  (Long and Freese, 2006), therefore 
we rely on a count regression method to predict analyst coverage. Poisson model is a count 
regression model which corrects for the discrete, count data nature of the dependent variable 
and is especially suitable when the (conditional) mean and variance of the dependent variable 
are equal. If the equality of the (conditional) mean and variance does not hold, then the standard 
errors generated by a maximum likelihood of the Poisson will be underestimated thereby 
conveying incorrectly high level of significance, in such case a negative binomial count (NBC) 
regression method is more suitable (Rock et al., 2000). In this paper, a negative binomial count 
regression method is used. Since endogeneity is an issue for our research model, we use two-
stage regression analysis to control for this potential bias. We run the analysis with one and 
two estimated variables and compare the results. 
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Table 4 shows the results of the second-stage regression model after estimating each of ABP 
and CPI using instrumental variables in results not tabulated. It shows that the results seem to 
strongly indicate that firms operating in a highly clean country (measured by high levels of the 
variable CPI) attracts fewer analysts, once the effect of presence of the anti-bribery policy (and 
the control variables) is taken into consideration. This appears to be quite a consistent finding. 
This finding contradicts results from Chen et al. (2010) that operating in corrupt countries 
makes it harder for analysts to predict firms’ future earnings and cash flows. However, once 
the variable CPI is replaced by estimated instrumental variable, the relationship becomes 
positive. The results also show that adopting anti-bribery policies at the firm level (ABP) has 
a positive and significant association with analyst coverage consistent with hypothesis no 2. 
This finding supports recent empirical evidence by Healy and Serafeim (2016) that self-
reported anti-corruption policies reflect a genuine commitment by companies to combat bribery 
and corruption at firm level and not merely cheap talks, thus induce high analyst coverage. 
Finally, the results of the interaction term capturing the effect of operating in a less corrupt 
country and the adoption of anti-bribery depend upon the choice of the variable approximating 
corruption. With the CPI index, the adoption of anti-corruption policies does not induce analyst 
coverage, rejecting thereby hypothesis no 3. However, if the estimated CPI variable is used, 
anti-corruption policies appear to induce analyst coverage, in line with hypothesis no 3. 
In terms of the control variables the results are remarkably consistent regardless of the choice 
of variable CPI. Analyst coverage (NOA) is significantly and positively associated with the 
number of institutional investors (NINST), firm size (MCAP), market beta (BETA) and the 
quality of accounting standards (GAAP) consistent with results prior studies (e.g., Bhushan, 
1989; Hussain, 2000; Rock et al., 2000; Boubaker and Labégorre, 2008; Kim and Shi, 2012). 
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NOA is also significantly and positively (negatively) associated with CGOV (GDP). Consistent 
with results from prior studies, NOA is negatively associated with business complexity (SEG) 
(e.g., Bhushan, 1989; Rock et al., 2000). Surprisingly, firm profitability (ROA) is negatively 
associated with NOA. This result indicates more analyst coverage for less profitable firms 
unlike results from prior studies (e.g., Boubaker and Labégorre, 2008). This is potentially due 
to less profitable firms having more volatile stock returns, as can be seen from the negative and 
significant association between ROA and each of VOL and BETA in Table 3, which induces 
more demand on outside analyst service.  
Finally, Khalil et al. (2015) find that firms are less likely to bribe bureaucrats in countries which 
have more extensive financial reporting requirements and those where audit firms face a higher 
litigation and sanction risk. At the firm level, Khalil et al. (2015) find that firms are less likely 
to bribe bureaucrats when their financial statements are reviewed by an external audit firm. 
Taken together, the results of Khalil et al. (2015) might indicate that the current analysis is 
prone to omitted variable bias3. Thus, as a robustness check, we re-run the analysis after 
controlling for audit quality; a dummy variable4 (BIG4) that takes the value of 1 if a firm’s 
accounts are audited by one of the big four audit firms and 0 otherwise, and the business extent 
of disclosure (DISC), a disclosure index of the business extent of disclosure at the country-
                                                 
3 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. The results of this extra regression are not 
included in the paper for reasons of space, but are available, upon request, from the authors.  
 
4 auditor size is often used in prior studies as a surrogate of audit quality (e.g. Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2008; 
Chen et al., 2011). This  line of research might be  interpreted as either  larger auditors provide higher quality 
audits  as  they  have  more  wealth  and  reputation  at  risk  (DeAngelo,  1981),  or  smaller  auditors  supplying 
unacceptably  low  levels  of  audit  quality  (DeFond  and  Francis,  2005).  Smaller  audit  firms  report  less 
conservatively (issue fewer non‐clean audit reports), and their clients are more likely to have abnormal accruals, 
which is suggestive of more aggressive earnings management.  
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level provided by the World Bank, in results not tabulated to test the consistency of our results.  
It is also worth noting that the quality of accounting standards at the firm level is considered 
using GAAP, and the quality of the governance and monitoring roles at the country level are 
considered using CGOV. Our main results continue to hold after the inclusion of both BIG4 
and DISC in the analysis. Also, the BIG4 variable was interacted with the variable capturing 
governance rules at country level (CGOV). The results were in line with the previous findings. 
Furthermore, we test whether the three variables of interest, i.e. ABP, CPI and ABP*CPI, are 
redundant and might thus be deleted from the research model, in results not tabulated, after 
accounting for the several firm-level and country-level controls including BIG4. The redundant 
variable hypotheses are rejected for any pair of these variables and for the three variables 
jointly, which indicates that these variables are significant estimators of the number of analysts 
following a company.   
5.	Concluding	remarks	
This study investigates the impact of corruption at country level and firm’s action to tackle 
corruption on analyst coverage employing a negative binomial count regression method for a 
sample of S&P Global 1200 companies for the years 2010 to 2015. To remove the issue of 
endogeneity and improve the reliability of the variable corruption, both variables corruption 
perception (CPI) and anti-bribery policies (ABP) were instrumented. The results are affected 
by the choice of corruption index. However, they show that the adoption of anti-bribery policies 
at firm level attract more analysts to follow a firm, in line with our hypothesis. However, firms 
operating in countries with higher levels of corruption appear to attract higher analyst coverage, 
consistent with the importance of the monitoring role of analyst coverage in highly corrupt 
countries, only if the corruption perception index is used. Once the CPI is estimated by 
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instrumental variables, the relationship is in line with the transaction cost hypothesis that 
analyst coverage increases in less corrupted countries. The same conclusion applies to the case 
when the variables corruption at country level and anti-bribery policies are interacted. The 
relationship is strongly positive and significant in the case of the instrumented CPI.  
The findings of this paper have several important implications. Firstly, the results of the current 
study provide robust evidence that proactive actions by firms, such as the adoption of anti-
bribery policies, can initiate or strengthen a positive process of increased analyst coverage 
leading to higher degrees of monitoring. Given the significant role played by analysts in 
uncovering fraud, as documented by Dyck et al. (2010), this is an important finding. Secondly, 
this paper also contributes to the extant literature on corruption by providing empirical evidence 
on the consequences of corruption at firm level, rather than the causes of corruption. This is an 
important contribution because there is a serious imbalance between the number of papers 
examining the causes of corruption than its consequences as observed by Judge et al. (2011). 
Thirdly, this study also contributes to the literature on the determinants of analyst coverage by 
extending the determinants of analysts following beyond firm characteristics to include firm 
policy and institutional factors. This contribution is particularly crucial at a time when 
investment firms are now required to clearly state the costs of any investment advice they may 
provide because of the recent introduction of the new regulatory framework contained in the 
European Union Market in Financial Instruments Directive and Regulation (MiFID II). 
Investment firms are required to inform clients whether the investment advice is provided on 
an independent basis to ensure that clients are not sold inappropriate products, and that 
inducements are only allowed if they benefit the client (Lannoo, 2017). The paper also sheds 
an important light on the consequences of the adoption of anti-corruption measures at firm 
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level such as anti-bribery policies. One practical implication is to encourage firms to adopt 
anti-corruption measures to reduce the incidence of corruption and increase analyst coverage.  
This result is particularly timely and practically relevant since the new European Directive 
2014/95/EU requires large companies to include non-financial information about anti-
corruption and bribery in their annual reports from 2018 onwards. A political implication is to 
expand efforts to produce reliable and consistent controls of corruption across companies and 
countries, perhaps through the introduction of compulsory anti-bribery measures. Finally, the 
paper establishes both theoretical and empirical links between two strands of research, i.e. 
analyst coverage and corruption, which may provide new material to incorporate in the syllabus 
of some courses in finance and motivate future research on the determinants and consequences 
of the adoption of anti-corruption and bribery measures at firm level.    
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Table 1:  A summary of variable measurement 
This table reports the definition of the different variables. 
Variable  Definition 
NOA  The total number of analysts making recommendations for the security at the financial year‐end.
CPI  The corruption score at the country level provided by Transparency International. It takes a value from 
0 to 100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 100 means it is perceived 
as very clean. 
ABP  It represents firms’ self‐reported anti‐corruption policies. It is a dummy variable that takes the value 
of one if the company has policies in place to prevent corruption and zero otherwise. 
HRP  A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company has implemented any initiatives to 
ensure the protection of the rights of all people it works with, and 0 if the company has not explicitly 
disclosed any such efforts in its Annual or Company Responsibility reports. 
BEP  A dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the company has established ethical guidelines 
and/or a compliance policy for its non‐management/executive employees in the conduct of 
company business, and 0 if the company has not explicitly disclosed this policy in its Annual or 
Company Responsibility Reports. 
FDI  The percentage of foreign direct investment net inflow to GDP.
Openness   Imports of goods and services (% of GDP).
NINST  The number of institutions holding shares in a company.
INST (INSID)  The percentage of institutional (insiders’) holding in a company.
MCAP  The market value of equity of the firm at the fiscal year‐end. 
SEG  The number of recorded business segments.
VOL  The standard deviation of the relative price change for the 360 calendar days closing price, 
expressed as a percentage. 
BETA  The market model beta for each stock measured via the market model using weekly data.
ROA  The return on assets measured as net income divided by total assets. 
GAAP  A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country applies US accounting standards or 
international financial reporting standards (IFRS) and 0 otherwise. 
INDUSTRY  A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the relevant industry and 0 otherwise. 
CGOV  A governance index developed using the principal component analysis. It is the first principal 
component of all corporate governance indicators at country level except the control of corruption 
indicator. 
GDP  The gross domestic product per capita.
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Table 2: A breakdown of the sample by country 
Country  Obs.  NOA  CPI  GDP 
Australia  230  15  81  53363 
Austria  24  23  80  47571 
Belgium  54  22  73  44509 
Bermuda  4  19  71  83752 
Brazil  12  12  38  11483 
Britain  583  22  77  39742 
Canada  273  20  82  48987 
Chile  25  12  68  13969 
China  42  29  24  5533 
Denmark  30  28  85  58894 
Finland  42  26  87  45972 
France  270  27  70  41265 
Germany  168  34  78  44138 
Greece  30  14  47  23593 
Hong Kong  65  20  75  34574 
Ireland  35  20  77  50183 
Italy  105  26  54  34713 
Japan  821  15  74  45701 
Luxembourg  12  26  83  104425 
Mexico  28  13  35  9235 
Netherlands  78  29  83  50550 
Norway  30  28  87  88442 
Portugal  24  16  63  21830 
Singapore  35  24  77  49716 
South Africa  6  23  45  7534 
South Korea  44  42  61  23624 
Spain  89  30  61  29898 
Sweden  134  24  86  53156 
Switzerland  153  27  86  75056 
United States  2442  21  74  49791 
Grand Total  5888  22  74  46851 
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Table 3: Descriptive Analysis for Variables 
 
NOA ABP  CPI  NINST INST INSID MCAP VOL SEG BETA ROA GAAP GDP 
Panel A: 
 Mean  21.59 0.62  74.30 633.35 66.43 1.34 28361.17 31.47 3.86 1.05 4.70 0.89 46851.33 
 Median  21.00 0.70  74.37 498.50 70.43 0.23 13577.58 28.62 3.00 1.02 3.93 1.00 48455.21 
 Std. Dev.  8.85 0.24  8.00  492.07 25.99 4.13 45079.35 13.69 2.66 0.30 6.52 0.31 9907.94 
Panel B: 
NOA  1.000
ABP  0.399a 1.000     
CPI  ‐0.005 0.048a  1.000  
NINST   0.389a 0.253a  0.038a 1.000  
INST   ‐0.029b 0.097a  0.092a 0.357a 1.000  
INSID   0.017 ‐0.063a  ‐0.004 0.013 ‐0.012 1.000
MCAP   0.409a 0.291a  ‐0.056a 0.614a ‐0.080a ‐0.014 1.000
VOL   ‐0.115a ‐0.275a  ‐0.178a ‐0.328a ‐0.089a ‐0.011 ‐0.231a 1.000
SEG   0.097a 0.024c  0.022c 0.061a ‐0.200a ‐0.106a 0.166a ‐0.056a 1.000
BETA   0.010 ‐0.061a  ‐0.008 ‐0.059a 0.105a 0.018 ‐0.120a 0.534a 0.038a 1.000
ROA   0.100a 0.082a  0.060a 0.234a 0.148a 0.104a 0.193a ‐0.309a ‐0.154a ‐0.227a 1.000
GAAP   0.292a 0.550a  0.023c 0.263a 0.311a 0.069a 0.126a ‐0.075a ‐0.131a 0.042a 0.112a 1.000
GDP   ‐0.001 0.002  0.724a 0.191a 0.125a 0.033a 0.004 ‐0.130a 0.010 0.088a 0.042a 0.042a 1.000 
N= 5,888 firm‐year observations. Superscripts a, b, c: correlations are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (2‐tailed) respectively. 
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Table 4: Method: ML ‐ Negative Binomial Count (Quadratic hill climbing) with  QML 
(Huber/White) standard errors & covariance   
Dependent variable: Number of analysts following (NOA)   
One estimated variable*  Two estimated variables** 
Β0  1.460a 1.362a ‐1.432a  1.917a
ABP  0.126a 0.276  0.164a  ‐6.984a
CPI  ‐0.007a ‐0.006c 0.034a  ‐0.011 
ABP*CPI  ‐0.002    0.097a
NINST  5.33E‐05a 5.29E‐05a 7.53E‐05a  8.20E‐05a
INST  ‐3.52E‐04  ‐3.41E‐04  ‐5.27E‐04b  ‐5.48E‐04b
INSID  ‐1.74E‐03  ‐1.76E‐03  ‐1.44E‐04  ‐4.16E‐04 
LOG(MCAP)  0.177a 0.177a 0.161a  0.159a
VOL  0.001  0.001  0.001c  0.001c
SEG  ‐0.004c ‐0.004c ‐0.002  ‐0.002 
BETA  0.131a 0.131a 0.081a  0.078a
ROA  ‐0.004a ‐0.004a ‐0.003a  ‐0.003a
GAAP  0.322a 0.322a 0.327a  0.317a
COMMUNICATIONS  0.152a 0.152a 0.153a  0.151a
INDUSTRIAL  0.013  0.013  ‐0.004  ‐0.004 
DIVERSIFIED  ‐0.364a ‐0.359a ‐0.546a  ‐0.528a
ENERGY  0.150a 0.149a 0.133a  0.133a
TECHNOLOGY  0.202a 0.202a 0.195a  0.197a
UTILITIES  ‐0.097a ‐0.097a ‐0.109a  ‐0.112a
BASIC MATERIALS  0.114a 0.114a 0.067a  0.066a
CONSUMER CYCLICAL  0.101a 0.101a 0.079a  0.082a
CONSUMER NONCYCLICAL  ‐0.029  ‐0.029  ‐0.012  ‐0.012 
CGOV  0.044a 0.044a 0.007b  0.007b
GDP  ‐3.09E‐06a ‐3.08E‐06a ‐2.78E‐06a  ‐2.93E‐06a
Adjusted R‐squared  0.40  0.40  0.39  0.39 
Log likelihood  ‐13021.92  ‐13021.79  ‐19742.91  ‐19728.39 
Obs.  3897  3897  5888  5888 
Superscripts a, b, c: coefficients are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (2‐tailed) respectively. *: ABP is estimated 
using instrumental variables. **: both ABP and CPI are estimated using instrumental variables. 
 
 
